The Implications Of Accounting Conservatism For The Relation Between Earnings And Stock Returns by Pae, Jinhan
Journal of Business & Economics Research – December, 2008 Volume 6, Number 12 
55 
The Implications Of Accounting 
Conservatism For The Relation Between 
Earnings And Stock Returns 
Jinhan Pae, Korea University Business School, Korea 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Characterizing accounting conservatism as the accountants’ tendency to require a higher degree 
of verification for recognizing good news than bad news, Basu (1997) predicts that the slope 
coefficient and R
2
 in a regression of earnings on concurrent stock returns will be higher for bad 
news (negative stock returns) than for good news (positive stock returns). However, standard 
econometric analysis indicates that the R
2
 is a function of the sensitivity of earnings to returns and 
the noise ratio, which is defined as the ratio of the variance of noise in earnings to the variance of 
noise in returns. I show that the R
2
 from the regression of earnings on stock returns is not 
necessarily higher for bad news than for good news. So the test of R
2
 is not a robust test of 
accounting conservatism. Consistent with the prediction, I find that the slope coefficient is higher 
for bad news firms reporting losses than for good news firms reporting profits, but R
2
 is lower for 
bad news firms reporting losses than for good news firms reporting profits.  
 
Keywords:  accounting conservatism; earnings; returns; reverse regression 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
his paper examines the empirical implications of accounting conservatism for the relation between 
earnings and stock returns. Accounting conservatism characterized as differential verifiability 
requirements for recognizing gains versus losses (Basu 1997; Watts 2003) implies that accounting 
recognizes bad news (negative stock returns) in earnings on a timelier basis than it does good news (positive stock 
returns). Given that there is no generally accepted definition of accounting conservatism
1
,
 
many studies (Basu 1997; 
Pope and Walker 1997; Givoly and AHayn 2000; Ball, Kothari, and Robin 2000; Ryan and Zarowin 2003; Pae 2007) 
use the test of differential timeliness of earnings between good and bad news to examine the existence and 
magnitude of accounting conservatism. These studies examine the slope coefficient and R
2
 in a regression of 
earnings on stock returns, and interpret a higher slope coefficient and/or R
2
 for bad news firms than for good news 
firms as evidence of accounting conservatism. This paper revisits the issue of the effect of accounting conservatism 
on the relation between earnings and returns: the sensitivity of earnings and the R
2
 in the regression of earnings on 
returns.
2
  
 
Basu (1997) posits and finds that the slope coefficient and R
2
 in the regression of earnings on returns are 
greater for bad news firms than for good news firms. Basu‟s (1997) prediction on the asymmetric sensitivity of 
earnings (the slope coefficient) between good and bad news rests on the two assumptions: (1) the R
2
 in the 
                                                 
1 Feltham and Ohlson (1995, 1996) characterize accounting conservatism as the book value of equity being on average less than 
the market value of equity in the long run. Pae et al. (2005) refer to Basu‟s (1997) characterization of the relation between 
earnings and returns as earnings conservatism and Feltham and Ohlson‟s characterization of the relation between the book value 
and market value of equity as balance sheet conservatism.  
2 This paper does not examine under what conditions firms will optimally choose a conservative reporting. See Kwon, Newman, 
and Suh (2001), Gigler and Hemmer (2001), and Ahmed et al. (2002) for analytical modeling of conservative accounting, and 
Watts (2003) for a good review on the demand for accounting conservatism. 
T 
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regression of earnings on returns is greater for bad news than for good news, and (2) the ratio of variance of earnings 
to variance of returns is greater for bad news than for good news. These two assumptions lead to a higher slope 
coefficient for bad news than for good news.
3
  Empirical evidence is generally consistent with his slope coefficient 
prediction; however, the R
2
 prediction seems less robust compared to the slope coefficient prediction. For example, 
Hayn (1995) examine the relation between earnings and returns in the liquidation option context. By partitioning 
firms into firms reporting profits (“profit” firms) and firms reporting losses (“loss” firms), Hayn (1995) reports that 
the slope coefficient in a regression of returns on earnings is much smaller (almost zero) for loss firms than for profit 
firms, and that the R
2
 is much lower (almost zero) for loss firms than for profit firms. Since the regression of 
earnings on returns in Basu (1997) is the reverse regression of Hayn (1995) or vice versa, the lower slope coefficient 
for loss firms in Hayn (1995) is consistent with the predicted higher slope coefficient for bad news firms in Basu 
(1997). However, the R
2
 result in Hayn (1995) appears inconsistent with the prediction of Basu (1997) since there 
should be no difference in R
2
 between the direct and reverse regressions.
4
 On the other hand, Ball, Kothari, and 
Robin (2000) examine the impact of the origin of legal system on the timeliness of earnings of seven countries using 
the reverse regression of Basu (1997). Their table 3 reports that code-law countries, in particular France and Japan, 
have a higher slope coefficient for bad news than for good news, but have a lower R
2
 for bad news than for good 
news. Based on the R
2
 result, which conflicts with the slope coefficient result, one cannot assert that accounting in 
France and Japan is less conservative or less timely for bad news than for good news. 
 
Consistent with more robust empirical evidence on the slope coefficient, my model is based on the 
assumption that the more fundamental feature of accounting conservatism is that the sensitivity of earnings with 
respect to stock returns (the slope coefficient in the regression of earnings on returns) is greater for bad news than 
for good news, which is contrasted to Basu (1997) who starts with the conjecture that the R
2
 is greater for bad news 
than for good news. My model is based on the assumption that the relative leniency in the recognition of bad news 
as compared to good news leads to a more timely recognition of bad news than good news and a possibly greater 
measurement error with bad news than good news due to inherent difficulty in estimating future cash flows in bad 
news situations. The timely recognition of bad news and delayed recognition of good news ensures that the slope 
coefficient in the regression of earnings on concurrent stock returns is higher for bad news than for good news. 
However, standard econometric analysis shows that R
2
 is not necessarily higher for bad news than for good news. R
2
 
is shown to be a function of the sensitivity of earnings and the noise ratio, which is defined as the ratio of the 
variance of noise in earnings to the variance of returns. A timely recognition of bad news increases the R
2
 of bad 
news while a potentially greater measurement error with bad news will decrease the R
2
. If the noise ratio is relatively 
high for bad news, it is quite possible that the R
2
 is lower for bad news than for good news. This paper emphasizes 
that the R
2 
is not a robust test of accounting conservatism or timeliness of earnings so that we should not put too 
much emphasis on the comparison of R
2
 between the good and bad news in assessing accounting conservatism and 
timeliness of earnings in a cross-sectional and time-series analysis. 
 
To explore the possibility that the slope coefficient is greater, but the R
2
 is lower for bad news than good 
news, I partition the samples of good news and bad news into the profit and loss sub-samples. I focus on firms in 
which the sign of earnings matches the sign of stock returns: good news firms reporting profits and bad news firms 
reporting losses. Empirical tests of the relation between earnings and returns on this restricted sample show that the 
slope coefficient is higher for bad news firms reporting losses than for good news firms reporting profits, but the R
2
 
is lower for bad news firms reporting losses than for good news firms reporting profits, corroborating the prediction 
of the econometric analysis that the R
2
 is not necessarily greater for bad news firms than for good news firms. This 
empirical result, however, should be interpreted with caution because partitioning on the dependent variable, 
earnings, may lead to biased estimates (Hausman and Wise 1977). On the other hand, Dietrich, Muller, and Riedl 
                                                 
3 Using the following relationship between the slope coefficient (β) and R2: 
)Returnsvar(
)Earnignsvar(22
R , Basu (1997, footnote 7)  notes 
that a higher R2 and a greater variance ratio for bad news than good news implies a greater slope coefficient for bad news than 
good news. 
4 Basu (1997) argues that the R2 result in Hayn (1995) is sensitive to specification issues such as risk adjustment. Note that there 
is a subtle difference between Basu (1997) and Hayn (1995) in partitioning firms into two distinct groups. However, the two 
partitioning schemes are related because bad news firms are more likely to report losses than profits, and good news firms are 
more likely to report profits than losses.  
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(2003) argue that when accounting information drives stock returns, the correct specification is the regression of 
returns on earnings. In that case, partitioning on returns is also subject to the same econometric problems. Given that 
there is no consensus on the correct specification, both earnings and returns are not free from this potential 
econometric issue. However, it appears that the slope coefficient result is consistent regardless of the specification, 
whereas R
2
 is not. As a practical matter, the test of the slope coefficient would be a more robust test of accounting 
conservatism than the test of R
2
.  
 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an analytical model that incorporates 
asymmetric sensitivity of earnings between good news and bad news, and examines the impact of accounting 
conservatism on the relation between earnings and returns. Section 3 reports sample selection and descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 presents empirical findings. A summary is reached in section 5. 
 
2.  MODEL 
 
A firm‟s earnings reports can be viewed as a signal generated by the firm‟s accounting system, 
incorporating the news that the firm has received for the reporting period.
5
 In an efficient capital market, the stock 
price impounds all value relevant information without delay. Since the change in firm value or returns represents the 
implications of news to future prospects of the firm, I assume that the mapping of news into earnings is equivalent to 
mapping of current stock returns into earnings. For simplicity and consistency with extant empirical studies, I 
partition news into good or bad, and assume that the mapping is influenced by whether the news is good or bad.  
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where Xt  and Rt are earnings and stock returns for period t, respectively. The model assumes that current reported 
earnings is a function of current and past stock returns. It is consistent with extensive empirical evidence that stock 
returns precede accounting earnings for several periods (e.g., Kothari and Sloan 1992; Kothari and Zimmerman 
1995). The coefficients on stock returns ( and B) represent the sensitivity of earnings in recognizing good news as 
profits and bad news as losses. I assume that there is asymmetry in the sensitivity of earnings depending on whether 
news is good or bad. Consistent with the notion of conservative accounting in Basu (1997), I assume that bad news 
is more quickly recognized in the concurrent earnings than good news, that is, 01  B . That is, accounting 
earnings reflects concurrent bad news in a timelier manner than it does concurrent good news. I assume that the 
coefficient on returns is greater than zero, implying that at least some part of the current period‟s news is reported as 
earnings in the same period.
6
 For simplicity and without loss of generality, B  is set to one, implying that bad news 
is immediately and fully recognized as losses in the concurrent period.
7
 () represents the impact of past returns on 
current earnings. I do not specify how past returns are reflected in the current period‟s earnings. Under the 
assumption that bad news is immediately recognized as losses in the current period, only good news will affect 
future periods‟ earnings. Since returns are uncorrelated across periods under no-arbitrage opportunity condition in 
the capital markets, the regression of current earnings on only concurrent returns will not bias the estimate of the 
                                                 
5 I do not model a possible information asymmetry between a firm and the market. That is, I do not consider the case in which the 
firm uses earnings report to signal her private information to the capital market or other related parties. It is beyond the scope of 
this study. 
6 The model excludes the case of “excessive” conservatism/timeliness by setting the upper bound to one. The exclusion of 
excessive conservatism/timeliness implies that auditors and other institutional factors limit firms‟ ability to overstate profits and 
losses.  The relaxation of this constraint does not affect the analysis. 
7 Equivalently, one can think of  as the ratio of the sensitivity of earnings for good news to the sensitivity of earnings for bad 
news. Alternatively, 1/  can be interpreted as the relative sensitivity of earnings for bad news compared to good news. 
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coefficient on concurrent stock returns. In the subsequent discussion, I will replace () with a constant, .8 t
represents a noise affecting reported earnings, but uncorrelated with current and past returns. I do not assume that 
the variance of the noise in earnings is the same between good news and bad news. The variance of the noise in 
accounting earnings under bad news ( Bt ) may be greater than the variance of the noise in accounting earnings 
under good news ( t ) due to the inherent measurement errors associated with the estimation of future losses and 
some incentive issues associated with bad news.  Finally, following Basu (1997), I use non-negative returns as a 
proxy for good news, and negative returns as a proxy for bad news, assuming that there is no measurement error in 
stock returns with respect to news, or the market is efficient with respect to news. The simplified model relating 
returns to earnings is 
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Consistent with the above model, Basu (1997) examines accounting conservatism by estimating the 
following regression separately for good news and bad news: 
 
ttt RX    (1) 
 
The coefficient on stock returns is expected to be  for good news firms (G =  ) and one for bad news 
firms (B = 1). Since  is assumed to be less than one, the slope coefficient of bad news is greater than that for good 
news ((B > G), which is consistent with Basu (1997).   
 
Basu (1997) also predict that the R
2
  will be higher for bad news than for good news. The R
2
s of regression 
(1) for good news (G) and bad news (B) are 
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 The R
2
 depends on the sensitivity of earnings () and the ratio of the variance of the noise in earnings to the 
variance of returns ( )(/)( 22 newsnews R  ) conditional on news. I will refer to the latter as the “noise” ratio, and it 
will be denoted by (news). I define the sensitivity adjusted noise ratio as one plus the noise ratio deflated by the 
square of the sensitivity of earnings. The sensitivity adjusted noise ratios for good and bad news are ( 2/)(1  G ) 
                                                 
8 If there is a consistent application of conservative accounting, the expected impact of past returns on current earnings is more 
likely to be positive since good news is more likely to be delayed than bad news. That implies a positive intercept in the 
regression of earnings on concurrent returns (Basu (1995)).  
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and ( )(1 B ), respectively.9 In the presence of measurement error or noise in earnings, the ratio of 
2
BR  to 
2
GR  
increases with the relative sensitivity of earnings for good news (), and decreases with the noise ratio for bad news 
( )(B ). It can be seen that the R2 for bad news is higher (lower) than that for good news if, and only if, the 
sensitivity adjusted noise ratios for bad news is lower (higher) than that for good news. The discussion so far can be 
summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1:  Assume that accounting conservatism is characterized as in equation (1). The regressions of 
earnings on stock returns for good news and bad news will imply the following: 
 
(i) The coefficient estimate on stock returns, which represents the sensitivity of earnings, is higher for bad 
news firms than that for good news firms, that is, 
GB   . 
 
(ii) The R2 is higher (lower) for bad news than for good new if, and only if, the sensitivity adjusted noise ratio 
is lower (higher) for bad news firms than for good news firms.  
 
 
22 )( GB RR   if, and only if,
2/)(1)()(1  GB  , 
 
where  is the sensitivity of earnings for good news, and  )(/)(}),{( 22 newsnewsBGnews R   represents the 
ratio of the variance of noise in earnings to the variance of returns conditional on news(“noise” ratio). 
 
Proposition 1 emphasizes that even if earnings is more sensitive to bad news than good news ( < 1), the 
R
2
 is not necessarily greater for bad news than for good news. The prediction on the relative magnitude of R
2
 
between good and bad news is an empirical question. Under the maintained position that earnings for bad news is 
noisier than earnings for good news (ξ(B) > ξ(G)), if the noise ratio is sufficiently greater for bad news than good 
news and the sensitivity of earnings for good news () is not close to zero, then the R2 can be lower for bad news 
than for good news. That is, asymmetric sensitivity of earnings between good and bad news does not necessarily 
imply a higher R
2
 for bad news than good news.  
 
Observe that R
2
 will be perfect if there is no noise in reported earnings.
10
 For example, a firm may report 
earnings that equals the decrease of the market value of equity for the fiscal period for bad news or 10 per cent of the 
increase of the market value of equity for good news. In this case, earnings becomes a sufficient statistics with 
respect to stock returns even if the sensitivity of earnings differs between good and bad news. That is, the noise in 
earnings or the reporting error is critical in specifying the differences in R
2
 between good news and bad news.
11
 I 
will exclude the cutting edge case of no noise in earnings. Consider cases in which the sensitivity of earnings is low 
for good news compared to bad news (i.e.,  is close to zero), there is no difference in the noise ratio between good 
news and bad news, or the ratio is greater for good new than for bad news. In these cases, it is not guaranteed that 
the R
2
 is higher for bad news than good news.  
 
                                                 
9 In general, the sensitivity of earnings for bad news differs from unity. If the sensitivity of earnings for bad news is B 1, the 
sensitivity adjusted noise ratio for bad news will be (
2
/)(1
B
B  ). 
10 Throughout the paper, I assume that the sensitivity of earnings is constant. If it is not the case, R2 will be less than perfect. 
11 Even if the R2 of an individual firm-specific regression is perfect, the use of cross-sectional regression can create a lower R2 for 
good news firms than for bad news firms. If the variation of the sensitivity of earnings among good news firms is greater than the 
variation of the sensitivity of earnings among bad news, the R2 will be lower for the good news firms than for bad news firms. 
Note that it is due to the cross-sectional variation of the sensitivity of earnings among good news firms, not due to the inherent 
lack of sensitivity of earnings signal for good news as compared to the sensitivity of earnings for bad news. 
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Corollary 1: (1) If the sensitivity of earnings to good news () is close to zero, or (2) the noise ratio is independent 
of the content of news ( 0)()(   BG ), or (3) the noise ratio is greater for good news than for bad news 
( )()( BG   ), then the R2 is higher for bad news than for good news. 
 
Note that the last two conditions in Corollary 1 are against my maintained position that bad news is more 
likely to lead to noisier reported earnings than good news. In general, earnings will be noisier for bad news than 
good news. As earnings for bad news becomes noisier, the R
2
 of bad news firms will decrease. Proposition 1 
predicts that if the magnitude of the noise ratio of bad news firms is substantially large relative to that of good news 
firms, the R
2
 of bad news firms could be less than the R
2
 of good news firms. This case will be illustrated later in 
empirical tests. However, note that this condition is very stringent to meet because the sensitivity of earnings to bad 
news is generally substantially greater than that to good news, which means that the square of the ratio of the 
sensitivity of earnings to bad news to the sensitivity of earnings to good news, (1/)2 is very  big. In that case, the 
sensitivity adjusted noise ratio is more likely to be greater for good news than for bad news, which means a higher 
R
2
 for bad news than good news. 
 
Next, I examine the impact of accounting conservatism on the regression of returns on earnings, which is 
contrasted to the regression of earnings on returns analyzed earlier. Hayn (1995) reports that the slope coefficient 
and R
2
 are higher for firms reporting profits (“profit firms”) than for firms reporting losses (“loss firms”).  Since the 
regression of earnings on returns in Hayn (1995) is the reverse of the regression of returns on earnings in Basu (1997) 
or vice versa, the finding of the slope coefficient being higher for profits firms than for loss firms is consistent with 
Basu (1995). But, the finding of the R
2
 being higher for profits firms than for loss firms is apparently inconsistent 
with Basu (1997) since there should be no difference in R
2
 between the direct and  reverse regressions. I examine the 
role of measurement error or noise in earnings on this seemingly conflicting result using the following regression of 
returns on earnings: 
 
ttt bXaR  . (4) 
 
Note that there is a difference between Basu (1997) and Hayn (1995) in partitioning sample firms. Basu 
(1997) uses the sign of stock returns to partition the sample into good or bad news sub-samples, whereas Hayn 
(1995) uses the sign of earnings to partition the sample. To control for the effect of different partitioning variables 
and focus on the effect of measurement error or noise in earnings, I adopt the partitioning scheme of Basu (1997).
12
 
The R
2
s of regression (4) for good and bad news are the same as those for the regression of earnings on returns in 
equations (2) and (3). The slope coefficients of regression (4) for good news and bad news are
13
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Unlike the slope coefficients in Basu (1997), the slope coefficients in the regression of returns on earnings 
are a function of the relative sensitivity of earnings () and the sensitivity adjusted noise ratio (1+()/2). Note that 
earnings are assumed to be measured with error.
14
 The reverse regression of Basu (1997) is not influenced by the 
                                                 
12 In empirical tests, I also present the regression results with the sign of earnings as the partitioning variable. 
13 The slope coefficient in the regression of returns on earnings (b) can be also inferred from the following relation using the 
slope coefficient () and R2 in the regression of earnings on returns :  
}.,{  where,/)(
2
NGnewsnewsRb
newsnews
   
14 If earnings are measured without error, i.e., R2=1, the coefficient on earnings will be the inverse of the coefficient on returns. 
In that case, the higher coefficient on returns for bad news ensures the higher coefficient on earnings for good news,
BGGB
bb   . 
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noise in earnings since earnings is specified as the dependent variable, but the regression of Hayn (1995) is 
influenced by the noise in earnings. It can be seen that the estimate of the coefficient on earnings will be greater for 
good news than for bad news if the product of the sensitivity of earnings and the sensitivity adjusted noise ratio is 
higher for bad news than for good news.  
 
Proposition 2: The slope coefficient in the regression of returns on earnings is greater (smaller) for good news than 
for bad news if, and only if, the product of the sensitivity of earnings and the sensitivity adjusted noise ratio is 
smaller (greater)  for good news than bad news. 
 
BG bb )(  if, and only if, ))(1()()/)(1(
2 BG   . 
 
 When the noise ratio is independent of the content of news (   )()( BG ), the slope coefficient will be 
higher for good news than for bad news if, and only if, the common noise ratio () is smaller than . That is, 
 )( BbbG  if, and only if,  )( .
15
 
 
Proposition 2 states that the ordering of the estimates of the coefficients on earnings depends on the 
sensitivity of earnings and the sensitivity adjusted noise ratio while proposition 1 states that the ordering of R
2
 
depends on the sensitivity adjusted noise ratio alone. Since the model assumes that the fundamental feature of 
conservative accounting is a greater sensitivity of earnings for bad than good news, the following relations follow 
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Now, it follows  
 
2222 or  BGBGBGBG RRbbbbRR   
 
By construction, the estimate of the coefficient on returns is always greater for bad news than for good 
news, that is, )()1(   GB . However, propositions 1 and 2 state that GB    does not necessarily imply 
22
GB RR   and/or BG bb  . Due to the noise in earnings, the R
2
 prediction of Basu (1997) does not necessarily hold, 
and the reverse regression of earnings on returns and the usual regression of returns on earnings are not the mirror 
image of each other.  
 
So far, it is assume that the correct specification is the regression of earnings on returns. However, Dietrich, 
Muller, and Riedl (2003) argue that when information drives stock returns, the correct specification is the standard 
regression of returns on earnings. In that case, the reverse regression of earnings on returns coupled with partitioning 
on returns causes econometric problems associated with truncated samples (Hausman and Wise 1977): asymmetric 
sensitivity of earnings to bad versus good news could be an artifact of partitioning on returns. It is beyond the scope 
of the study to determine the correct specification. However, it seems that accounting and stock returns influence 
each other. It is well documented that stock prices react to news in earnings announcements. At the same time, firms‟ 
earnings reacts to the change in market values of firms. For example, the lower of cost or market rules in GAAP for 
inventories and marketable securities influences accounting earnings when the market value of an asset is lower than 
the book value of the asset. The more accurate picture will be the interaction between earnings and returns, rather 
than one influences the other. So, neither the regression of earnings on returns nor the regression of returns on 
earnings is free from the potential econometric problem associated with partitioning on the dependent variable. The 
empirical test results are reported for both the standard regression of returns on earnings and the reverse regression 
of earnings on returns.  
 
                                                 
15 If the sensitivity of earnings for bad news (B) is different from 1, the condition becomes B )( . 
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3.  DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Earnings per share and stock prices are obtained from COMPUSTAT, and annual stock returns are 
calculated by compounding the CRSP monthly stock returns. I use the basic earnings per share (including 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations) deflated by beginning-of-fisca-year stock price as a measure of 
earnings (Xt). Annual stock returns (Rt) are measured for the year ending three months after the fiscal period end. 
Observations in the top and bottom one percent of earnings and returns in each year are deleted to mitigate the effect 
of extreme observations. The resulting sample consists of 138,880 firm-year observations over the sample period 
1964 through 2001.  I partition the sample into firms experiencing non-negative annual stock returns (“good news 
firms”) and firms experiencing negative annual stock returns (“bad news firms”). The sample is also partitioned into 
firms reporting profits (“profit firms”) and firms reporting losses (“loss firms”). Table 1 reports the distribution of 
the sample partitioned by the signs of stock returns and earnings. Bad news firms and loss firms are 44 percent and 
23 percent of the sample firm-years, respectively. Consistent with other studies (Hayn 1995; Givoly and Hayn 2000), 
the proportion of firms reporting losses has increased in recent years.  
 
 
Table 1:  Distribution of the Sample by the Signs of Returns and Earnings 
Good news represents firms with non-negative returns and bad news represents firms with negative returns 
 
Year 
No. of 
Obs. 
Good News Bad News 
% of Bad 
News 
Profits Losses 
% of 
Losses 
1964 847 692 155 18% 821 26 3% 
1965 929 643 286 31% 906 23 2% 
1966 1,117 647 470 42% 1,096 21 2% 
1967 1,270 923 347 27% 1,218 52 4% 
1968 1,312 1,045 267 20% 1,269 43 3% 
1969 1,424 267 1,157 81% 1,352 72 5% 
1970 1,652 998 654 40% 1,455 197 12% 
1971 1,860 1,040 820 44% 1,618 242 13% 
1972 2,003 653 1,350 67% 1,846 157 8% 
1973 2,939 672 2,267 77% 2,778 161 5% 
1974 3,288 1,089 2,199 67% 2,973 315 10% 
1975 3,268 2,767 501 15% 2,902 366 11% 
1976 3,041 2,083 958 32% 2,822 219 7% 
1977 3,218 2,306 912 28% 2,971 247 8% 
1978 3,214 2,524 690 21% 3,028 186 6% 
1979 3,349 1,798 1,551 46% 3,076 273 8% 
1980 3,565 3,035 530 15% 3,154 411 12% 
1981 3,625 1,256 2,369 65% 3,073 552 15% 
1982 3,885 3,093 792 20% 2,994 891 23% 
1983 3,968 2,362 1,606 40% 3,046 922 23% 
1984 4,256 2,244 2,012 47% 3,257 999 23% 
1985 4,264 2,772 1,492 35% 3,039 1,225 29% 
1986 4,245 2,483 1,762 42% 2,932 1,313 31% 
1987 4,498 1,438 3,060 68% 3,143 1,355 30% 
1988 4,663 2,639 2,024 43% 3,285 1,378 30% 
1989 4,537 2,283 2,254 50% 3,119 1,418 31% 
1990 4,551 1,927 2,624 58% 3,088 1,463 32% 
1991 4,560 2,919 1,641 36% 3,043 1,517 33% 
1992 4,649 2,694 1,955 42% 3,175 1,474 32% 
1993 4,936 2,743 2,193 44% 3,474 1,462 30% 
1994 5,867 3,036 2,831 48% 4,390 1,477 25% 
1995 6,116 4,327 1,789 29% 4,518 1,598 26% 
1996 6,307 3,646 2,661 42% 4,636 1,671 26% 
1997 6,551 4,523 2,028 31% 4,698 1,853 28% 
1998 6,336 1,633 4,703 74% 4,358 1,978 31% 
1999 6,012 3,130 2,882 48% 4,209 1,803 30% 
2000 5,859 2,531 3,328 57% 3,890 1,969 34% 
2001 899 431 468 52% 558 341 38% 
Total 138,880 77,292 61,588  107,210 31,670  
(%)  (55.65%) (44.35%)  (77.2%) (22.8%)  
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. Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the full sample. The mean and median market-to-book 
ratios, which are defined as the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity, are 2.90 and 1.43, 
respectively, suggesting that accounting is on average conservative over the sample period if the market-to-book 
ratio is used as a measure of balance sheet conservatism (Pae, Welker, and Thornton 2005). The median annual 
stock returns and earnings per share deflated by the beginning stock price is 5.6% and 6.4%, respectively.  Accruals 
(ACC) are calculated by the change in non-cash working capital plus depreciation. Cash flows from operations 
(CFO) are calculated by subtracting accruals from net income.
16
 Accruals and cash flows from operations are 
deflated by beginning-of-fiscal-year market value of equity. Accruals are on average negative due to depreciation, 
and the median cash flows from operation are positive. 
 
Panel B and C report the descriptive statistics of the good and bad news sub-samples and the profit and loss 
sub-samples. In terms of market capitalization and sales, the good news and profit firms are on average bigger than 
the bad news and loss firms. The median market-to-book ratio is greater for the good news and profit samples than 
for the bad news and loss samples. If accruals are used to expedite the recognition of bad news, the ratio of accruals 
to cash flows will be higher for bad news (Pae, Welker, and Thornton 2005;Pae 2007). Consistent with this 
argument, the ratio of the absolute value of the median accruals to the median cash flows is grater for bad news 
(0.67=0.035/0.052) than for good news (0.37=0.046/0.123).  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
X is earnings per share deflated by the beginning stock price, and R is stock returns for the year ending three months after fiscal 
period-end. MV is the market value of equity at fiscal year end. P/B is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of 
equity at fiscal period end. Sales are annual sales. ACC is accruals measured by the change in working capital (excluding cash) 
plus depreciation. CFO is cash flow from operation measured by net income minus Acc. If cash flow statement is available, CFO 
is obtained from cash flow statement and accruals are calculated as net income minus CFO. ACC and CFO are deflated by the 
beginning market value of equity. Good (bad) news is represented by non-negative (negative) stock returns. Conservative 
(aggressive) accounting firms denote firms whose annual stock returns (R) are higher (lower) than earnings (X). 
 
Panel A: Full Sample (#obs = 138,880) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 Min Max 
R 0.128 0.555 -0.203 0.056 0.347 -0.972 8.250 
X 0.034 0.190 0.007 0.064 0.113 -3.085 0.961 
MV 1,041.11 6,955.81 17.88 71.88 349.26 0.06 508,329 
P/B 2.90 59.14 0.86 1.43 2.49 -3,008 10,474 
Sales 1,038.60 4,957.78 26.60 106.37 443.80 -48.12 206,083 
ACC -0.083 0.457 -0.137 -0.041 0.013 -30.309 46.209 
CFO 0.113 0.437 0.006 0.090 0.196 -45.997 27.619 
 
Panel B: Good News versus Bad News 
Variable 
Good News (#obs = 77,292) Bad News (#obs = 61,588) 
Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 
R 0.456 0.139 0.305 0.587 -0.284 -0.422 -0.240 -0.109 
X 0.078 0.045 0.086 0.139 -0.020 -0.053 0.034 0.077 
MV 1,302.10 26.48 105.37 492.12 713.56 12.01 44.51 204.74 
P/B 3.08 0.97 1.56 2.70 2.67 0.75 1.27 2.22 
Sales 1,229.02 35.45 135.70 560.01 799.57 18.88 77.31 319.70 
ACC -0.081 -0.141 -0.046 0.012 -0.085 -0.131 -0.035 0.015 
CFO 0.158 0.043 0.123 0.241 0.059 -0.029 0.052 0.138 
 
Panel C: Profits versus Losses 
Variable 
Profit Firms (#obs = 107,210) Loss Firms (#obs = 31,670) 
Mean Q1 Median Q3 Mean Q1 Median Q3 
R 0.186 -0.117 0.111 0.385 -0.069 -0.474 -0.210 0.128 
X 0.104 0.051 0.083 0.132 -0.200 -0.254 -0.113 -0.047 
MV 1,248.04 26.03 102.58 471.11 340.08 7.15 23.10 84.85 
P/B 2.67 0.91 1.44 2.36 3.68 0.67 1.37 3.31 
Sales 1,222.05 42.13 146.80 571.82 417.73 5.62 26.69 122.19 
ACC -0.042 -0.105 -0.030 0.024 -0.210 -0.278 -0.102 -0.016 
CFO 0.150 0.044 0.113 0.218 0.000 -0.108 -0.018 0.089 
                                                 
16 If cash flow statements are available (after 1986), cash flows from operations are directly obtained from cash flow statements. 
In that case, accruals are calculated as the difference between net income and cash flows from operations. 
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4.  Empirical Results 
 
4.1  The Impact Of Accounting Conservatism On The Relation Between Earnings And Returns 
 
 
Table 3:  The Relation between Earnings and Returns: Mean Estimates of Annual Cross Sectional Regressions 
 
Regression 1: ititttit RX    
Regression 2: 
ititttit XbaR   
 
Xit is earnings per share deflated by the beginning stock price, and Rit is stock returns for the year ending three months after fiscal 
period-end. Means of the estimates of the coefficients from the above annual cross-sectional regressions are reported. T-values in 
parentheses are calculated based on the estimates of the coefficients from annual regressions. Good (bad) news is represented by 
non-negative (negative) stock returns. Conservative (aggressive) accounting firms denote firms whose annual stock returns (Rt) 
are higher (lower) than earnings (Xt). The noise ratio () is the ratio of the variance of the residual of regression 1 to the variance 
of returns. 
 
Panel A: The Full sample 
 α  Adj. R
2 
 a b 
Mean of Annual regressions  
(t-value) 
0.036 
(3.99) 
0.102 
(11.51) 
0.098 0.12 0.065 
(2.10) 
1.113 
(7.87) 
 
Panel B: Good News versus Bad News Samples 
 α  Adj. R
2 
 a b 
Good News:       
Mean of Annual regressions (t-
value) 
0.074 
(11.20) 
0.025 
(3.42) 
0.020 0.13 0.372 
(13.41) 
0.299 
(2.51) 
Bad News:       
Mean of Annual regressions (t-
value) 
0.064 
(7.95) 
0.285 
(12.44) 
0.100 1.28 -0.253 
(-20.98) 
0.453 
(6.88) 
 
Panel C: Profit versus Loss Samples 
 α  Adj. R
2 
 a b 
Profits:       
Mean of Annual regressions (t-
value) 
0.093 
(16.35) 
0.056 
(9.83) 
0.119 0.03 -0.045 
(-1.80) 
2.435 
(14.74) 
Losses:       
Mean of Annual regressions (t-
value) 
-0.186 
(-14.18) 
0.019 
(3.28) 
0.002 0.24 -0.064 
(-1.62) 
0.035 
(0.96) 
 
Panel D: News versus Signs of Earnings  
 α  Adj. R
2 
 a b 
Good News and  
Profits (I) 
      
Mean of Annual regressions (t-
value) 
0.099 
(17.00) 
0.041 
(7.22) 
0.052 0.05 0.260 
(13.86) 
1.274 
(9.50) 
Good News and 
Losses (IV) 
      
Mean of Annual regressions (t-
value) 
-0.182 
(-13.29) 
-0.017 
(-1.69) 
0.005 0.26 0.465 
(12.54) 
-0.165 
(-2.81) 
Bad News and 
Losses (III) 
      
Mean of Annual regressions (t-
value) 
-0.170 
(-15.36) 
0.096 
(3.51) 
0.010 1.95 -0.345 
(-20.74) 
0.062 
(3.65) 
Bad News and 
Profits (II) 
      
Mean of Annual regressions (t-
value) 
0.092 
(16.34) 
0.081 
(12.87) 
0.062 0.18 -0.258 
(-20.92) 
0.836 
(8.89) 
See Figure 1 for the classification of firms into four categories. 
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To examine the impact of the content of news and the measurement error or noise in earnings on the 
relation between earnings and returns, I estimate the regression of returns on earnings and the reverse regression of 
earnings on returns separately. The estimate of the slope coefficient in the reverse regression of earnings on returns 
is used to infer the degree of sensitivity of earnings to stock returns. The adjusted R
2
 and the regression of returns on 
earnings are used to examine the impact of noise in earnings. I estimate the two regressions each year from 1964 to 
2001, and report the mean coefficient estimates and the mean adjusted R
2
 (Fama and MacBeth (1973)). Panel A of 
Table 3 reports the results of annual cross-sectional regressions for the full sample. The mean of the adjusted R
2
 is 
0.098. The mean coefficient estimate on returns () is 0.102, which is significantly positive at the 0.01 level.  The 
mean coefficient estimate on earnings (b) is 1.113, which is significantly different from the value expected (9.804 = 
1/0.102, the inverse of ) under no measurement error in earnings, suggesting that a significant amount of 
measurement error or noise in earnings would influence the R
2
 and would bias the estimated slope coefficient in the 
regression of returns on earnings. 
 
Next, I partition the sample into good news and bad news sub-samples based on the sign of annual stock 
returns. Consistent with Basu (1997), Panel B reports that the mean coefficient estimate on returns is higher for bad 
news firms than for good news firms. If I interpret the coefficient on returns as the timeliness of earnings with 
respect to stock returns, I can state that earnings for bad news are more than eleven times as timely as earnings for 
good news (11.4 = 0.285/0.025). The mean adjusted R
2
 is also higher for bad news firms than for good news firms. 
The noise ratio (), which is defined as the ratio of the variance of noise in earnings to the variance of returns, is 
inferred from the (un-adjusted) R
2
 and the estimate of the coefficient on returns () using the following relation: 
222 /)1( RR  . As predicted, the noise ratio is higher for earnings for bad news (1.28) than for earnings for 
good news (0.13). However, the sensitivity adjusted noise ratio (
2/1  ) is still higher for good news than that for 
bad news, which explains why the adjusted R
2
 is higher for bad news than that for good news even if the noise in 
earnings is greater for bad news than for good news. These results are consistent with predictions in Basu (1997). 
 
The regressions of returns on earnings show that the mean coefficient estimate on earnings is higher for bad 
news (0.453) than for good news (0.299). This result demonstrates that the reverse regression of earnings on returns 
is not the mirror image of the regression of returns on earnings, and vice versa. If they were the mirror image of each 
other, I would expect that the estimate of the coefficient on earnings is higher for good news than for bad news. 
Proposition 2 predicts that the coefficient on earnings is a function of the sensitivity of earnings and the noise ratio 
of earnings. If earnings are measured without noise or at least there is no difference in the sensitivity adjusted noise 
ratios between good news and bad news, the coefficient on earnings will be greater for good news than for bad news. 
Our regression results demonstrate that in the presence of measurement error in earning, the higher coefficient on 
returns and the higher adjusted R
2
 for bad news do not assure the higher coefficient on earnings for good news than 
for bad news. 
 
Panel C reports the regression results of profit versus loss firms. Consistent with Hayn (1995), the 
coefficient on earnings (b) is not significantly different from zero and the adjusted R
2
 is close to zero for loss firms. 
The reverse regression of earnings on returns shows that the mean coefficient estimate on returns is higher for profit 
firms (0.056) than for loss firms (0.019). Once again, this demonstrates that the reverse regression and the direct 
regression are not the mirror image of each other. 
 
 The analyses so far corroborate the importance of the noise in earnings when one assesses the relation 
between earnings and returns. In order to examine the interaction between the sign of earnings and the content of 
news measured by the sign of annual stock returns, I partition the sample into four sub-samples based on the signs of 
earnings and returns: good news firms reporting profits, good news firms reporting losses, bad news firms reporting 
losses, and bad news firms reporting profits.
17
 I examine whether Basu‟s (1997) predictions for good versus bad 
news hold for these samples further conditioned on the sign of earnings. This restriction will provide further insights 
into the effect of the signs of returns and earnings into the relation between earnings and returns.  
                                                 
17 In calculating mean coefficients, I exclude years in which I have less than 30 observations (mostly in 1960s). I have used 33 
years for quadrant III (bad news/loss partition), and 31 years for quadrant IV (good news/loss partition) 
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First, I focus on the sub-samples in which the sign of earnings matches the sign of returns, that is, firms in 
quadrants I and III in Figure 1. Quadrant I includes good news firms reporting profits, and quadrant III includes bad 
news firms reporting losses. The imposition of this restriction is made to test the robustness of the R
2
 prediction by 
Basu (1997).  
 
 
Figure 1:  The Relation between Earnings and Returns 
 
 
 
If earnings for bad news is noisier than earnings for good news, and the difference in sensitivity of earnings 
between bad news and earnings is modest, proposition 2 predicts that the coefficient on returns is higher for bad 
news than for good news, but the adjusted R
2
 can be lower for bad news than for good news.
18
 The results in Panel D 
support this prediction. The mean coefficient estimate on returns is higher for bad news/losses sample (0.096) than 
for good news/profits sample (0.041), but the adjusted R
2
 is lower for bad news/losses sample (0.01) than for good 
news/profit sample (0.052).
19
  
 
To summarize, inconsistent with Basu (1997), the adjusted R
2
 can be lower for bad news firms than for 
good news firms. Consistent with Proposition 1, the empirical results indicate that a higher sensitivity of earnings for 
bad news than good news does not necessarily imply a higher R
2
 for bad news than good news. However, the 
empirical result should be interpreted with caution because partitioning on the dependent variable, returns or 
earnings, may lead to biased estimates (Hausman and Wise 1977). If the correct specification is the regression of 
earnings on returns as in Basu (1997), it is problematic to partition on earnings. On the other hand, if the correct 
specification is the regression of returns on earnings (Dietrich, Muller, and Riedl 2003), partitioning on returns 
causes econometric problems. It is beyond the scope of this study to determine the correct specification in 
examining the relation between earnings and returns. So the empirical results presented in Panel D should be 
interpreted with this caveat.  
 
I also estimate the regressions for the remaining firms in quadrants II and IV, in which the sign of stock 
returns differs from the sign of earnings. The mean coefficient estimate on returns is not significantly different from 
zero for good news firms reporting losses (quadrant IV) while the mean coefficient estimate on returns is 
significantly positive for bad news firms reporting profits (quadrant II), suggesting that earnings are timelier for bad 
news than for good news regardless of the sign of earnings. However, the adjusted R
2
 is very low for the good news 
                                                 
18 Note that the noise ratio for bad news/loss firms in quadrant III is 1.95, which is almost 40 times larger than the noise ratio for 
good news/profit firms in quadrant I. 
19 Note that the ratio of sensitivity of earnings to bad news/loss to sensitivity of earnings to good news/profit (2.34=0.096/0.041) 
on the restricted sample is lower than that in the full sample in Panel B of Table 3 (11.4=0.285/0.025). 
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firms reporting losses (quadrant IV). It seems that the observed low adjusted R
2
 of the good news sample in Panel B 
is mainly due to good news firms reporting losses (quadrant IV). On the other hand, the adjusted R
2
 for bad news 
firms reporting profits (quadrant II) is the highest in the four quadrants. The high adjusted R
2
 for bad news reported 
in Panel B seems to be driven by bad news reporting profits firms rather than bad news firms reporting losses firms. 
The analysis presented in Panel D shows that the coefficient on returns is higher for bad news than for good news, 
but the adjusted R
2
 is sensitive how bad news are further partitioned. 
  
4.2  Sensitivity Tests 
 
 The descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 shows that the sample contains observations with extreme 
values of returns and earnings even after I delete the top and bottom one percent of observations in stock returns and 
earnings in each year. In order to assess the impact of these extreme observations on the results presented earlier, I 
further delete observations in which returns are greater than 3 or earnings per share deflated by beginning-of-fiscal-
year stock price is less than -3. The results (not tabulated) are qualitatively similar to those reported in the previous 
section. 
 
 I use annual stock returns calculated for the year ending three months after the fiscal period end in order to 
make sure that all accounting information is available before the beginning of the return period. As an additional 
check, I repeated the analyses using annual stock returns calculated for the fiscal period. The results (not tabulated) 
are robust to the choice of the return period. 
 
 In the main analysis, I do not include past stock returns since the omission of past stock returns do not bias 
the coefficient on stock returns under the assumption that current stock returns are uncorrelated with past stock 
returns under no-arbitrage condition. As an additional check, I add four years of lagged stock returns as additional 
explanatory variables. The inclusion of past stock returns increases the adjusted R
2
, however, the results (not 
tabulated) are qualitatively similar to those presented in the previous section. 
 
5.  SUMMARY 
 
This paper examined the implications of accounting conservatism for the relation between earnings and 
stock returns. The econometric analysis shows that R
2
 is not necessarily higher for bad news firms than for good 
news firms. In particular, the R
2
 for bad news firms can be lower if earnings are substantially noisier for bad news 
firms than for good news firms. It is shown that the adjusted R
2
 is lower for bad news firms reporting losses than for 
good news firms reporting profits. This study emphasizes that the test of R
2
 is not a robust test of accounting 
conservatism. 
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